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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE AUTHORITY OF THE TRIAL COURT UPON A RETIiIAL TO VACATE
AND SET ASIDE THE VERDICT OF A JURY
The trial court may set aside and vacate the verdict of a jury
upon the grounds that the verdict is either inadequate or excessive, or
is against the evidence and contrary to law.' The power to vacate
and set aside the verdict of a jury upon the ground that it is against
the weight of the credible evidence in the case rests in the exercise of
the sound judicial discretion of the court.2 In a proper case, the trial
court not only has the right, power and authority, but it also has the
duty to vacate and set aside a verdict which is against the weight of
the credible evidence.3
These are fundamental propositions and seldom, if ever, cause
difficulty in their application. When, however, the trial judge, has
granted a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict is against
the weight of the credible evidence, and the appellate court has affirmed
such action as not constituting an abuse of discretion, a much more
difficult and subtler problem is presented to the second trial court,
when upon the same evidence the same party prevails upon the retrial.
In such a contingency, is the trial judge at the second trial bound to
set aside the verdict of the jury in favor of the prevailing party again
upon the grounds that the finding of the trial judge at the first trial
that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is now the law
of the case; or, may the judge at the second trial exercise a free and
independent judgment, and reach a different conclusion, without sub-
jecting himself to the charge of abuse of judicial discretion, even
though the verdicts of both juries were based upon the same identical
proof?
1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 549. Motion for new trial upon judge's minutes.
The judge, presiding at a trial by a jury, in his discretion, may entertain a
motion, made upon his minutes, at the same term, to set aside the verdict or a
direction dismissing the complaint and grant a new trial upon exceptions; or
because the verdict is for excessive or insufficient damages, or otherwise con-
trary to the evidence, or contrary to law. A minute of the decision of the
presiding judge denying a motion for a new trial shall be made, but an order
need not be entered unless the party aggrieved desires to take a separate appeal
therefrom.
2 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT § 549, supra note 1; Egan v. City of N. Y, 263 App.
Div. 387, 388, 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 337 (1942); Hogan v. Franken, 221 App.
Div. 164, 165, 223 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1927) ; Northam v. Dutchess County Ins. Co.,
68 App. Div. 475, 478, 74 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1902).
3 Dashnau v. City of Oswego, 204 App. Div. 189, 191-2 198 N. Y. Supp.
226 (1923) ; Leversee v. Neidermyer, 219 App. Div. 214, 2 16, 219 N. Y. Supp.591 (1927) ; Lyons v. Connor, 53 App. Div. 475, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1085 (1900).
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In both logic and justice, it would seem to be anomalous, if a
party, whose right to recover was once denied, were permitted a re-
covery upon a retrial, upon the same, identical proof upon which the
denial of recovery was based. It is undoubtedly the rule that what-
ever is once judicially established between the same parties in the
same case continues as the law of the case so long as the facts on
which the decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case. 4  It is, likewise, the rule that when an appellate court has passed
upon the weight or sufficiency of the evidence in a case that finding is
generally regarded as the law of the case if the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence is again presented for review or decision.5
The law, however, is not concerned with rules of logic in a sys-
tem of philosophy but solves its problems pragmatically. 6 And so
the last mentioned rule has been held to be one of convenience and
public policy.7
When a judgment has been reversed because it is against the
evidence or contrary to law, and no new evidence is adduced at the
second trial, the finding of the appellate court is binding and conclu-
sive upon the trial court at the retrial.8 But in those cases where the
appellate court has merely affirmed an order vacating and setting
aside the verdict of a jury upon the ground it is against the weight of
the credible evidence, the practical and pragmatic aspect of the situa-
tion becomes evident. In such cases the verdict was annulled by the
exercise of a discretionary power. This act of affirmarice does not
constitute a finding that the power was validly exercised but is deemed
to be a finding that resort to the power was not unwise and that the
judicial discretion was not abused. 9 Therefore, the rule of decision
laid down by the appellate court has no binding force and effect upon
the trial court at the second trial. The judge at the second trial is,
accordingly, free to exercise the discretion vested in him by law, and
may, in the sound judicial exercise of that discretion, deny a motion
to vacate and set aside a second verdict for the same party, notwith-
standing the evidence on the second trial is substantially the same as
4 21 C. J. S. 330; Rivara v. Stewart & Co., 241 N. Y. 259, 266-7, 149 N. E.
851 (1925) ; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 229 App. Div. 167, 169, 241 N. Y. Supp. 123
(1930), af'd, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930); Gelman v. Day, 229 App.
Div. 809, 242 N. Y. Supp. 394 (1930).
5 5 C. J. S. 1293-1296.
6 See Milks v. McIver, 264 N. Y. 267, 269, 190 N. E. 487 (1934), wherein
Judge Lehman, writing for the Court of Appeals upon the subject of proximate
cause in an action for negligence, said: "The law solves these problems
pragmatically."
Walker v. Gerli, 257 App. Div. 249, 251, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 942 (1939);
Reamer's Estate, 331 Pa. 117, 122 (1938).
8 Beers v. McNaught, 180 App. Div. 924, 167 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1917).
9 Hogan v. Franken, 221 App. Div. 164, 165, 223 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1927);




that adduced on the first trial. 10 However, precedent lays down the
practical rule that where two different juries have found a verdict
for the same party on the same evidence the second finding should
not be disregarded and lightly cast aside merely because the trial court
may not agree with it. In the absence of unusual or extraordinary
circumstances, the verdict should be sustained so that there may be an
end to the litigation.
WILLIAm F. McGINN.
ESTATE TAXES-INTER Vivos TRANSFER WITH POSSIBILITY OF
REVERSION
Where the decedent during his lifetime made a transfer of an
interest in real or personal property either by deed, trust, insurance
contract' or any other instrument by the terms of which he reserved
the power to revoke any part thereof, the estate tax laws, both federal
and New York State, hold such property to be taxable as a part of the
decedent's gross estate.2
Where the transfer is irrevocable, but the possibility of reversion
nevertheless exists dependent upon some condition set forth in the
instrument, the question of taxability is not as settled. In recent
years the subject of inter zvvos transfers has been litigated more than
any other estate tax question.
When the leading Supreme Court case of Klein v. United States 3
was decided in 1930 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted
to extract from the decision the rule that all transfers subject to the
possibility of reversion are taxable. The court in that case held that
a deed containing a provision that title was to revert to the grantor in
the event the grantee were to predecease him was a transfer merely of
a life estate; the transfer of the remainder could not be complete until
the death of the grantor. While the lower courts in cases following
the Klein case often adhered to the rule of that case,4 many decisions
10 McCann v. N. Y. & Q. County R. R. Co., 73 App. Div. 305, 306-8, 76
N. Y. Supp. 684 (1902), appeal dismissed, 172 N. Y. 599, 64 N. E. 1123 (1902) ;
Gutman v. Weisbarth, 194 App. Div. 351, 354-5, 185 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1920);
Lyman v. Village of Potsdam, 204 App. Div. 528, 529, 198 N. Y. Supp. 526(1923); Gnecco v. Pederson, 154 N. Y. Supp. 12, 14-15 (1915).
1 Goldstone v. United States, 325 U. S. 687, 65 Sup. Ct. 398 (1945).2 INT. Ry. Cona § 811(c), (d); N. Y. TAx LAW §249-r(4).
3 Klein v. United States, 282 U. S. 828, 51 Sup. Ct. 78 (1930); Klein v.
United States, 283 U. S. 231, 51 Sup. Ct. 398 (1930).
4 Union Trust Co. of Detroit v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 152, 52 Sup. Ct.
500 (1931); Estate of Morris Schinasi, 25 B. T. A. 1153 (1932); Estate of
Alfred J. Reach, 27 B. T. A. 972 (1933); Estate of. Waldo C. Bryant, 36
B. T. A. 669 (1937); Estate of John S. Conant, 41 B. T. A. 739 (1940);
Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 239 (D. C. Md.
1941).
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